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given the strong presumption that the discrimination was based on adequate
grounds,°° and given the wide discretion of the legislature to select the classes
to be regulated," this argument would seem to fail.
In conclusion, any discussion of the constitutionality of this statute
raises the conflict of two of the postulates of a legal order: stability versus
change, the importance of the ability of the individual to rely on existing
laws" as qualified by the necessity of the law in a constitutional society to
develop with the times in order to adapt to new social conditions and con-
form to new ideas of the common good. In spite of John Marshall's famous
remonstrance that "It is a Constitution we are expounding,"°° the sanctity
of private agreements and the vested rights they create seem, in this in-
stance, paramount to a regulation as drastic and as severe as that promul-




The Connecticut legislature recently amended the section of that state's
sales below cost act, which had allowed proof of certain acts to be prima facie
evidence of intent to injure competitors.' Prior to the amendment, this
section provided:
No retailer shall with intent to injure competitors or destroy
competition, advertise, offer to sell or sell at retail any item of mer-
chandise at less than cost to the retailer, and no wholesaler shall,
with such intent, advertise, offer to sell or sell at wholesale any
item of merchandise at less than cost to the wholesaler. Evidence of
any advertisement, offer to sell or sale of any item of merchandise
by any retailer or wholesaler at less than cost to him shall be prima
facie evidence of intent to injure competitors or destroy competi-
tion.2
 (Emphasis supplied.)
This section was declared unconstitutional by the Connecticut Supreme
Court of Errors in Mott's Super Mkts., Inc. v. Frassinelli.3
 The court found
that the language of the section concerning proof of intent had the inevita-
66 Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 88 (1940).
67 Barrett v. Indiana, 229 U.S. 26 (1913) ; Orient Ins. Co. v. Diggs, 172 U.S. 557
(1889); Barber v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27 (1885).
68 Slawson, supra note 39, at 233, points out that this reliance is especially necessary
in the making of contracts, formal legal obligations into which the parties enter with
full and careful regard for the legal consequences.
439 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 42-114 (Supp. 1963).
2 Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 42-114 (1958).
3 148 Conn. 481, 172 A.2d 381 (1961), noted in 36 Conn. B.J.147 (1962).
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ble effect of placing the burden of proving his innocence upon the alleged
violator. The court held that this was a denial of due process of law.
The law is by no means settled in this area. At the time of this writing,
of the thirty states' that have sales below cost legislation, fourteen have
provisions making proof of a sale, offer to sell or advertisement prima facie
evidence of intent to injure competitors. 5 The courts in deciding the constitu-
tionality of these provisions have for the most part been evenly divided .° It
is beyond the scope of this note to conclude which is the better view. Since
the Connecticut court's view was expressed in the Mott case, it is apparent
that the recent amendment to the Connecticut Sales Below Cost Act will
have to be construed in light of that decision. The amendment provides that:
No retailer shall for the purpose of injuring a competitor or
with the effect of injuring a competitor or destroying competition,
advertise, offer to sell or sell at retail any item of merchandise at
less than cost to the retailer, and no wholesaler shall, for the pur-
pose of injuring a competitor or with the effect of injuring a com-
petitor or destroying competition, advertise, offer to sell or sell at
wholesale any item of merchandise at less than cost to the whole-
saler. Repeated advertisements, offers to sell or sales of any item or
items of merchandise by any retailer or wholesaler at less than cost
shall be prima facie evidence of the purpose of injuring a competi-
tor or destroying competition.? (Emphasis supplied.)
The question arises whether by this amendment, the legislature has
corrected the constitutional defect in the section.
It is first noted that the original section contains the statement that
"No retailer shall with the intent to injure . . . ," while the corresponding
phrase of the amendment states that "No retailer shall for the purpose of
injuring . . ." (Emphasis supplied.) Although the word "intent" has been
replaced by the word "purpose" it is submitted that this substitution does
not appear to have in fact changed the meaning .°
The amendment adds the phrase ". .. or with the effect of injuring
. ." to the original section. It is readily apparent that the meaning of the
section has been changed since the statute no longer requires the element
of intent. This type of provision is by no means new since twelve states have
4 2 Trade Reg. Rep. Tr 6623: Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Hawaii,
Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana,
Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Penn-
sylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, Washington, \Vest
Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming.
5 Arizona, California, Connecticut, Idaho, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin.
6 2 Trade Reg. Rep. 6773 and cases cited.
7 Supra note 1.
8 "Purpose" is defined: "that which one sets before him to accomplish; an end,
intention, or aim. . . ." Black, Law Dictionary 1400 (4th ed. 1951) (Emphasis supplied.)
"Intent" is defined: "Intent in legal sense is purpose to use particular means to effect
certain result. . . ." Id. at 947. (Emphasis supplied.)
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included it in their sales below cost statutes .° The problem of whether in-
tent is a necessary element for a violation of a statute, such as the Sales
Below Cost Act, has been the subject of considerable litigation and the law
is far from settled in this area.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota found constitutional a Minnesota
statute which prohibited sales at less than cost for the purpose or with the
effect of injuring competitors.'° The court held that sales below cost which
have the effect of injuring competitors may be prohibited regardless of
intent"-
The Ohio Court of Appeals held constitutional a "weights and mea-
sures" statute which did not require intent as an element of proof of viola-
tion. The court reasoned that the legislature in its discretion could declare
an act to be criminal without the necessity of proving intent where the act
was destructive of the social order or where the proof of the intent element
was extremely difficult or impossible." It could be argued in support of the
Connecticut amendment that the element of intent to destroy competition
would, as a practical matter, be so difficult to prove that it should be removed
if it is clearly shown that the defendant's conduct did in fact destroy com-
petition or injure competitors.
The Supreme Court of Washington held constitutional a motor vehicle
statute that did not require criminal intent as an element of proof of viola-
tion." The court reasoned that although at common law intent was an
element of every crime this was no longer so. When the common law was
codified into criminal statutes intent was not made an element of those acts
regarded as mala prohibita, while intent was retained as an element for those
acts regarded as mala in se. It could be argued that sales below cost acts are
strictly mala prohibita and that as such, the legislature in its own discretion
may eliminate the need for the element of intent.
Although a case could be made to support the constitutionality of the
statute without the element of intent, several courts that have decided this
problem have held such statutes unconstitutional." For example, the
Supreme Court of Oklahoma in declaring the Oklahoma Sales Below Cost Act
unconstitutional because intent to injure competitors was not required, held
that such intent was an essential ingredient to the offense."
It would appear that, in light of the Mott opinion, the Connecticut
court would follow this latter view and declare the amendment unconstitu-
tional. In the Mott opinion the court stated that:
Proof of an intent to injure competitors or destroy competition
has generally been held essential to proof of a violation of unfair
0 2 Trade Reg. Rep. ¶ 6771: Arizona, Idaho, Louisiana, Minnesota, Nebraska, New
Hampshire, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Utah, Wisconsin.
10 McElhone v. Geror, 207 Minn. 580, 292 N.W. 414 (1940).
11 Ibid.
12 State v. Weisberg, 74 Ohio App. 91, 55 N.E.2d 870 (1943).
13 City of Seattle v. Gordon, 54 Wash. 2d 516, 342 P.2d 604 (1959).
14 For cases dealing with constitutional question, see generally 2 Trade Reg.
Rep. 	 6771.
12 Englebrecht v. Day, 201 Okla. 585, 208 P.2d 538 (1949).
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sales practices legislation. In the absence of proof of such an intent
the act would operate as price fixing legislation and could be chal-
lenged on constitutional grounds."
The court in concluding its opinion, stated that "It has been pointed out
herein that for an unfair sales practices act to be valid, proof of intent must
be expressly or impliedly required."" (Emphasis supplied.)
The Connecticut court could conceivably avoid the problem of actually
declaring the section unconstitutional and still hold intent a necessary ele-
ment. To achieve this result, the court could adopt the reasoning of the
United States Court of Appeals in Lynch v. Tilden Produce Co." The court in
Lynch was deciding a case under an adulterated butter statute which pro-
vided in part that it was a violation to use a process with the intent or effect
of causing the absorption of abnormal quantities of water, milk, or cream.
The court held that whatever is effected is the consequence of a specific
design and thus a rational agent's intent is behind every effect. As such, the
words "intent" and "effect" as used in the statute are practically synonymous.
The Supreme Court of Nebraska followed this line of reasoning in a case
involving the constitutionality of a sales below cost act which was similar to
the Connecticut amendment."
This line of reasoning seems to openly disregard the intention of the
legislature and, perhaps, should be avoided. The better view would seem to
be to declare the amendment unconstitutional. This would permit the court
to clearly determine the problem and leave no question as to the meaning
that would be given to the term "effect."
It is next noted that the original statute provided that "Evidence of
any advertisement, [or] offer to sell . . . shall be prima facie evidence of
intent to injure competitors . . . ," whereas, the amendment provides that
"repeated advertisements, offers to sell or sales . . . shall be prima facie
evidence of purpose of injuring a competitor. . . ." (Emphasis supplied.)
In comparing these two provisions, it is apparent that the only change made
was the substitution of the word "repeated" for the word "any." Since it
was precisely this area of the former section which was declared unconstitu-
tional in the Mott case, the obvious question presented is: does the substitu-
tion of the word "repeated" for the word "any" correct the constitutional
defect? In the Mott case the court in dealing with the prima facie evidence
problem stated that ". . . the fact which is specified to be prima facie
evidence of the fact to be inferred or presumed must be a fact which in
common experience leads naturally and logically to the fact inferred or pre-
sumed."2° The court then held that "Mlle fact that an article is advertised
for sale or sold at less than cost to the seller does not, in and of itself, pro-
duce, naturally and logically, a belief that the advertisement or sale is in-
tended to injure competition, or destroy competition." 21 In concluding, the
16 Mott's Super Mkts., Inc. v. Frassinelli, supra note 3, at 487, 172 A.2d at 384.
17 Id. at 491, 172 A.2d at 386.
18 282 Fed. 54 (8th Cir. 1922).
18 Hill v. Kusy, 150 Neb. 653, 35 N.W.2d 594 (1949).
20 MOWS Super Mkts., Inc. v. Frassinelli, supra note 3, at 490, 172 A.2d at 385.
21 Id. at 491, 172 A.2d at 386.
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court stated that "To fall within the prohibition of the statute, the conduct
must have been predominantly motivated by an intent to 'injure competitors'
or 'destroy competition' as distinguished from an intent to attract immediate
patronage to the store in the ordinary course of business."22 In comparing the
language of the amendment with the language just cited from the Mott
opinion, it would appear that the prima facie provisions have not been suffi-
ciently changed to correct the defect in the statute. It could be argued that
the word "repeated" is by no means clear and for purposes of testing the
statute could mean any number greater than "one." Assuming a retailer
made two sales below his cost and the state was able to prove this, it is
doubtful that the court would accept this as prima facie evidence of the
seller's intent to injure competitors. According to the court, the fact that one
article is sold at less than cost does not in and of itself produce naturally and
logically a belief that the sale was intended to injure competition. Therefore,
why would a sale of two or more articles produce the opposite result?
In conclusion, it is believed that the amendment, if tested by the Con-
necticut court, might well be declared unconstitutional as a violation of due
process of law because: (1) it does not require intent as a necessary ele-
ment; and (2) it shifts the burden of proof to the defendant and in essence
removes the presumption of innocence by having the "prima fade evidence
of purpose" clause.
FAIR TRADE
The Kansas legislature recently repealed the Kansas Fair Trade Law 23
Thus, Kansas joins the ranks of the five other states which do not have fair
trade provisions 24 Although the remaining forty-four states do have fair
trade laws," recent developments, both economic and legal, have done much
to emasculate their effectiveness. It will be the purpose of this note to briefly
examine these developments in an attempt to determine the future of fair
trade law.
A brief inquiry into the history of fair trade is necessary to have a
foundation upon which to commence an examination of the more recent
developments.
It has been said that the fair trade movement began shortly after the
Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co.2° decision was handed down by
the United States Supreme Court.27 The Court in Dr. Miles held that a system
of contracts between manufacturers and wholesale and retail merchants by
which the manufacturers attempt to control not merely the prices at which
its agents may sell its products, but also the prices for all sales by all dealers
at wholesale or retail whether purchasers or sub-purchasers, amounts to re-
straint of trade and is invalid both at common law, and, in so far as it affects
interstate commerce, under the Sherman Antitrust Act. Two years after this
22 Ibid.
23 Kan. Laws 1963 ch. 291.
24 2 Trade Reg. Rep. if 6017 (1963).
25 Ibid.
26 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
27 Herman, Fair Trade: Origins, Purposes and Competitive Effects, 27 Geo. Wash.
L. Rev. 621, 625 (1959).
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decision, the American Fair Trade League, an association of manufacturers
of branded goods, was organized and attempted to secure federal legislation
to sanction resale price maintenance contracts. 28 Although this group was
active and several fair trade bills were introduced in Congress, no fair trade
bill was enacted in this country until 1931.29 In 1931, probably as a result
of the general economic conditions of the country and attempts made to have
the states instead of Congress enact fair trade legislation, the California
legislature enacted the country's first fair trade act. 3° This initial act merely
legalized resale price contracts, but in 1933 an additional provision was
enacted rendering it unlawful for any person to resell a fair trade commodity
below the fair trade price if such person had knowledge of the established
resale price.31
 This latter provision has come to be known as the "nonsigner"
provision.
Before discussing the legality of the fair trade acts, it is important to
analyze the purposes of such acts." The proponents of the acts urged that
their enactment would help manufacturers, retailers, and consumers.
The manufacturers claimed that retailers were using brand-name items
as "loss-leaders"; that is advertising a well-known product at a very low
Price to attract customers to the store. This, they claimed, caused other
retailers to: (1) urge customers to buy another brand; (2) discontinue
carrying the brand altogether; (3) request that the manufacturer sell them
the brand for a lower cost. The manufacturers also contended that this re- •
suited in a loss of prestige for the brand and hurt the manufacturers' good-
will since consumers were led to believe that the low price represented the
product's real value.
The retailers argued that fair trade would aid them by preventing price
wars which were extremely hard on small retailers who, because of slow
turnover and high overhead, could not survive them. It was actually these
small retailers, namely the National Association of Retail Druggists, who in
1931 were responsible for California's enacting the first fair trade act. 33
The proponents further argued that fair trade acts would aid con-
sumers by lowering the general price level. This, they claimed, would result
from the curtailment of the use of "loss-leaders" which lowered the price of
one product but, in order to make up for this loss, raised the prices of other
products.
Whether the state legislatures actually believed fair trade would help
manufacturers, retailers, and consumers, or whether they were pressured into
enacting these laws because of strong lobbyists and a depression, is not at all
clear. Judge Weiss in a recent opinion said:
No small influence in propelling the fair trade movement is the
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
30 2 Trade Reg. Rep. If 6017 (1963).
31 Ibid.
32 For the purposes of fair trade acts, see generally: Herman, supra note 27, at
628.44; Phillips and Duncan, Marketing, Principles and Methods 729-35 (3d ed.
Irwin 1956).
33 Wilcox, Public Policies Toward Business 412 (Irwin 1955).
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fact that it was spawned in the depths of the depression. All of us
who were of mature age in that era recall that in many areas of
the country, people had lost faith in the workings of our free enter-
prise, competitive economy. This climate of course proved fertile
ground for a movement under the banner "Fair Trade"—with the
obvious implication that those who opposed them were "unfair
traders." A free pricing program was loosely characterized as being
synonymous with "predatory price cutting," "cut throat competi-
tion," and "loss-leader selling,"—terms which easily lend themselves
to emotionalism rather than logical analysis.84
On the other hand, proponents of the fair trade acts would undoubtedly
claim that the laws were passed because of their genuine value to the econ-
omy. Regardless of the reasons for their passage, the fact remains clear
that many were enacted.
In 1933, Oregon followed California's example and enacted the nation's
second fair trade act.35
 In 1935 eight other states followed and by 1941
forty-five states had enacted fair trade acts."
One of the biggest single factors in stimulating the fair trade movement
was the Supreme Court decision in Old Dearborn Distrib. Co. v. Seagram-
Distillers Corp., decided in 1936. 37 In upholding the Illinois Fair Trade
Act the Court reasoned that the manufacturer had made a substantial in-
vestment in advertising his brand and that the goodwill thus acquired was
a species of property that belonged to him. When his goods were sold, the
manufacturer parted with his product but not with his goodwill. When dis-
tributors cut his prices, they impaired the manufacturer's goodwill and thus
damaged his property. As a result, the Court held that since the primary
purpose of the Illinois Fair Trade Act was to protect property, namely the
goodwill of the producer, it was a valid act. The Court in upholding the
"non-signer" provision determined that there was not an unlawful delegation
of power to private persons to control the disposition of the property of
others and thus not a violation of due process. The Court reasoned that the
distributor was deemed to have assented to the protective restriction of the
fair trade law since he was at least presumptively aware of its provisions and
voluntarily purchased a product which he knew carried a "fair trade" price.
Until 1937 fair trade laws permitted resale price maintenance only
when both parties were in the same state. But when parties were in differ-
ent states such contracts were held to violate federal antitrust laws." Since
the great bulk of branded goods was transported across state lines, it became
necessary to amend the federal law if resale prices were to be maintained 3e
The Miller-Tydings Act was passed in 1937 and amended the Sherman
34 Olin Mathicson Chem. Corp. v. White Cross Stores, Inc., Trade Reg. Rep.
(1963 Trade Cas.) 1 7091, at 78,622 (Pa. Ct. of Cm. Pleas Sept. 18, 1963) (dictum).
95 2 Trade Reg. Rep. 16017 (1963).
36 Ibid.
37 299 U.S. 183 (1936).




Antitrust Act to provide that interstate contracts fixing resale prices within
those states where intrastate contracts had been legalized, were exempted
from the antitrust provisions of the Sherman Act."
This appeared to solve most problems facing fair trade advocates until
1951 when the Supreme Court decided Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Dis-
tillers Corp. 4 ' The Court held that the Miller-Tydings Act applied only to
parties to the contract and not to non-signers. This decision brought on a
rash of price wars and in one day brand name retail prices were cut as much
as thirty percent."
These price wars gave the proponents of fair trade acts an excellent
illustration of the need for Congressional action resulting in the 1952 enact-
ment of the McGuire-Keogh Fair Trade Enabling Act. This act amended
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act and in short, reversed the
Schwegmann case by extending the exemption of the Miller-Tydings Act to
include the non-signer's clause."
This brief history of the development of fair trade brings us to the
present state of the law in this area. At the present time, of the forty-four
states that have fair trade acts, four have been declared unconstitutional by
the states' highest court and of the remaining forty, seventeen have had their
"non-signer" provisions declared unconstitutional by the states' . highest
court." Of the remaining group, one state's "non-signer" provision was de-
clared unconstitutional by a lower court, nineteen states' "non-signer" pro-
visions were held constitutional by the states' highest court and one by a
lower court. The remaining states have not had the statute tested by a
court. 45
 Since 1950 there has been a trend by state courts to invalidate the
fair trade laws on state constitutional grounds.
The "non-signer" provision of the Arkansas act was declared uncon-
stitutional on the basis that it denied due process of law." Colorado's "non-
signer" provision was declared unconstitutional as a price fixing measure and
constituted an unlawful delegation of power to a manufacturer or producer."
Florida's "non-signer" provisions were held unconstitutional because they
constituted an invalid use of the police power of a state for private purposes
rather than a public purpose." Kentucky's "non-signer" provision was de-
clared unconstitutional as a legislative invasion of the broad constitutional
liberty of the people to acquire and protect their property. 4°
It is noted, however, that the industrial states, namely California,
Illinois, Massachusetts, New York, Ohio, and Pennsylvania, all have fair
40 Miller-Tydings Act, 50 Stat. 693 (1937), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1958).
41 341 U.S. 384 (1951).
42 Wilcox, op. cit. supra note 33, at 416.
43 McGuire Fair Trade Act, 66 Stat. 631 (1952), 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (3) (1958).
44 2 Trade Reg. Rep. 6041 (1963).
45 Ibid.
46 Union Carbide and Carbon Corp. v. White River Distrib's Inc., 224 Ark. 558,
275 S.W.2d 455 ( 1955).
47 Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp. v. Francis, 134 Colo. 160, 301 P.2d 139 (1956).
48 Miles Labs. Inc. v. Eckerd, 73 So. 2d 680 (Fla. 1954).
45 General Elec. Co. v. American Buyers Co-op., Inc., 416 S.W.2d 354 (Ky. 1958).
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trade acts which have been upheld by those states' highest courts. 5° This
seems to indicate that states which have a large urban population and pri-
marily an industrial economy, regard fair trade acts as beneficial. It could be
argued, at least, that these states with large cities would have a more com-
petitive economy and would, as a result, need such legislation more than a
rural agricultural state. This argument, however, would seem to be weakened
in light of Judge Weiss' opinion in a recent Pennsylvania lower court case."
The judge upheld the constitutionality of the Pennsylvania Fair Trade Act.
But, by use of extremely strong dicta, he attacked fair trade, claiming that
it was a price fixing scheme which conflicted with federal antitrust laws and
which denied consumers the benefit of price competition.
It is evident that this area of the law is far from settled and that no
positive legal conclusions can be drawn. It was in this climate that the Kansas
court in 1958, in deciding Quality Oil Co. v. E. I. Dupont de Nemours and
Co.,52
 held the Kansas "non-signer" provisions unconstitutional as an un-
authorized delegation of the legislature's power to private persons. The rest
of the statute was declared free from constitutional objection. Three years
later the legislature repealed the entire act." It could be argued that the
Kansas statute without the "non-signer" clause should have been left on the
books. However, while the statute might be perfectly legal, it is questionable
what value the provision would serve.
It is at this point that the economic aspects of the problem must be
considered.
As a result of the fair trade acts, the manufacturer sets his prices in
such a manner as not to affect the large department store or the small re-
tailer too drastically. This action results in a general raising of the average
price level since the large volume sellers would have to raise their prices."
Following such a general price raise, margins would be increased, but sales
would drop and the marginal cost would become greater. At this point, large
discounters could and would sell independent brands at low prices and
would be able to attract customers. The retailers bound by the fair trade
contracts would not be able to compete and would be required to either
resign themselves to the fact of losing customers or meet competition by
carrying independent brands.
The manufacturer, on the other hand, has a great deal to lose also, since
his resistance to fair trade may result in his loss of those retailer's associa-
tions that back him. In addition, if he yields and sets prices, he may lose
volume and thus leave himself open to competition from independents. Prob-
ably the most important reason for the failure of fair trade acts is the large
rise in the number of the discount stores. During the last few years, these
stores have become as common to the American way of life as baseball, and
their existence completely emasculates the fair trade acts. For example,
50 2 Trade Reg. Rep. U 6041 (1963).
51 Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp. v. White Cross Stores, Inc., supra note 34, at
78,628 (dictum).
52 182 Kan. 488, 322 P.2d 731 (1958).
53 Supra note 23.
54 Wilcox, op. cit. supra note 33, at 421.
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General Electric has spent a great deal of money hiring detectives to buy its
products at discount houses. With this as evidence, the company brings
court actions under the fair trade acts." The result has been that General
Electric has been awarded many judgments and the discount houses have
paid many fines. The discount houses, however, go right back to selling at
their original price claiming that the cost of the fines are much smaller than
the value received from publicity of those suits which show them sacrificing
themselves for the consumer.
The problem has really boiled down to fewer and fewer attempts by
manufacturers to enforce fair trade provisions. As a result, the fair trade acts
are of decreasing importance although still in effect in many jurisdictions.
It may be said in conclusion that:
(1) The legal validity of the fair trade acts is somewhat uncertain and
the trend seems to indicate that they are being declared at least in part un-
constitutional.
(2) Where the "non-signer" provision of the act has been declared un-
constitutional it may be concluded that the act has become valueless since
"non-signers" will be able to undersell those persons who are bound by the
contract with the result that no merchant will bind himself for fear of
losing customers.
(3) Even if the fair trade acts are found to be perfectly legal, must they
not also be justified on an economic basis? In answering this question many
economists feel these laws tend to destroy competition, breed inefficiency,
raise prices, and cut down initiative.
BURTON M. HARRIS
55 33 Harv. Bus. Rev. 53, 61 (1955).
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